Now that we've got rid of persie for this argument...GenVolkov wrote:If he had gone after it fast enough, those preparations would have been caught half done, which would make those preparations almost as useless as if they never happened at all.
The Home Fleet was available, but the question is, could it have gone out to meet the Germans fast enough when they started their attack? Also, could the Home Fleet have defended itself against the Luftwaffe bombers that would not have been needed to suppress the RAF? The Luftwaffe could have achieved local air superiority just through sheer force of numbers, if they really needed to in order to protect the troop ships.
Basically I'm saying that if the Germans got a foothold and weren't dislodged very quickly, (which I believe is quite possible for them to have done, even your article doesn't totally deny that possibility) the British would have lost quite soon afterwards.
I don't think "sheer force of numbers" is a terribly good argument in the long term. The more forces you throw at something, the greater your losses are: if your assumption were true, any battle in the world could be won by a one-time simple numerical superiority. To put it another way, you say the Luftwaffe could have protected the troop ships by sheer force of numbers. If that is true, why couldn't the Royal Navy prevent the troop ships by sheer force of numbers?
The article states that the most likely scenario in a full-blown attack would have been a local German superiority, followed by the Royal Navy moving in before enough supplies could have been shipped (i.e. armor) to consolidate the victory. Unarmored and undefended, even with ever so much air support (and don't forget, planes still have to fly from France and have a laughable air-time, captured pilots are out, etc.) no beachhead can stand.
BTW, it's not "my article". My sources are various, but WP sums the knowledge in main up pretty well. I never post a WP link I haven't reviewed thoroughly. Also, gotta give the Sandhurst demoers some credit.